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TELLEZ V. DOLE: NICARAGUAN 
BANANA WORKERS CONFRONT THE 
U.S. JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
ARMIN ROSENCRANZ* & STEPHEN ROBLIN**
“Here, fortunately, although there has been a strong attempt to bring 
the seeds of the Nicaraguan corruption here to this country, it has not 
succeeded, and if I have anything to say about it, it will not succeed.”1
—Judge Victoria Chaney 
“This is the face of American jurisprudence which these cases have 
presented to the other nations in this hemisphere: a legal system where 
a major American corporation can receive[] . . . permission from an 
American judge to recruit witnesses to testify in secret, free to 
fabricate outrageous lies which can be used to justify vacating a 
judgment won in an open, above-board jury trial.”2
—Steve Condie 
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, the U.S. judicial system has presided over a contest 
between Central American banana workers and the Dole Food Company 
and related entities. Lacking home country courts capable and willing to 
enable victims of corporate crimes to seek justice, some of these workers 
have tried to access U.S. courts. However, these foreign plaintiffs have 
typically been denied access through corporate defendants’ invocation of 
*J.D., Ph.D., Stanford University; former faculty, Stanford University, U.C. Berkeley, Boalt Hall, 
and Golden Gate University School of Law. 
**MPP, University of Maryland; Ph.D. Candidate, Cornell University. 
1 Transcript of Record at 19, Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. 
Cnty. Apr. 23, 2009). 
2 Appellants’ Opening Brief at 341, Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 WL 
891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. S217842). 
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forum non conveniens (FNC). FNC is a legal doctrine that gives a court 
the authority to reject a foreign plaintiff’s case on grounds that there is a 
more appropriate and convenient forum, namely the plaintiff’s home 
nation’s courts.3 While not devised for this purpose, in application this 
doctrine has immunized multinational corporations from accountability 
for their abuses committed abroad by effectively denying the victims 
their right to a remedy.4 In addition, the application of FNC by U.S. 
courts seems to violate multilateral treaties such as the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.5
In the late 1990s, several Latin American governments began 
drafting and enacting anti-FNC statutes to counter its effects.6 Nicaragua 
was among them. In 2000, its legislature passed Special Law 364 in 
response to political pressure coming from a movement of labor 
organizations, activists, and peasants.7
The movement represented former agricultural workers who labored 
on banana plantations directed by the corporate fruit giant, Standard Fruit 
(now Dole Food Company or Dole), in the 1970s and 1980s.8 During 
this time, plantation workers were exposed to the toxic pesticide 
3 See generally Erin Foley Smith, Right to Remedies and the Inconvenience of Forum Non 
Conveniens: Opening U.S. Courts to Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses, 44 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 145 (2010). 
4 Smith quotes Texas Justice Lloyd Doggett’s criticism of the doctrine in Dow Chem. Co. v. 
Castro Alfaro, where he referred to forum non conveniens as a “legal fiction with a fancy name to 
shield alleged wrongdoers.” He also stated that the doctrine “has nothing to do with fairness and 
convenience and everything to do with immunizing multinational corporations from accountability 
for their alleged torts causing injury abroad.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 
680–81 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring) (quoted in Smith, supra note 3, at 169–70 & nn.135–
136). Justice Doggett’s remarks on the effective immunity (i.e., corporate impunity) enjoyed by 
multinational corporations is supported empirically. As Smith explains, “studies indicate that a 
forum non conveniens dismissal is typically outcome-determinative—if the victims are unable to sue 
in U.S. courts, they are unable to recover for the violations of their rights. Therefore, the doctrine 
represents a real barrier for victims of human rights abuses at the hands of U.S. corporations.” Smith, 
supra note 3, at 165–66 (footnote omitted). Smith cites a study published in 1987 that surveyed 180 
transnational cases dismissed on the basis of the legal doctrine and found that none resulted in a 
victory in the foreign court. Id. at 165 n.104. 
5 See generally Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking 
Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 31 (2003). 
6 Id. at 22. 
7 Susanna Rankin Bohme, Pesticide Regulation, Citizen Action, and Toxic Trade: The Role 
of the Nation-State in the Transnational History of DBCP, in DANGEROUS TRADE: HISTORIES OF 
INDUSTRIAL HAZARD ACROSS A GLOBALIZING WORLD 168 (Christopher Sellers & Joseph Melling 
eds., 2012) [hereinafter Bohme, Pesticide Regulation]; see also Susanna Bohme, National Law, 
Transnational Justice? Countering Forum Non Conveniens in Nicaragua, in UNEQUAL EXPOSURES:
THE TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY OF A TOXIC PESTICIDE (forthcoming) [hereinafter Bohme, National
Law, Transnational Justice?].
8 Bohme, Pesticide Regulation, supra note 7; see also Bohme, National Law, Transnational 
Justice?, supra note 7. 
2
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol7/iss2/4
2014] TELLEZ V. DOLE 115 
dibromochloropropane (DBCP). DBCP was discovered in the mid-
1950s.9 By the mid-1970s, the U.S. National Cancer Institute found the 
chemical to be extremely carcinogenic. Afterwards, it became known 
that DBCP causes male sterility. Despite knowing the harmful effects of 
DBCP for humans, Dole continued to use the pesticide on its banana 
farms in Nicaragua as late as 1980.10
The movement, which emerged in the early 1990s, focused on 
changing Nicaraguan state policy as a means of attaining justice for 
DBCP-affected individuals. It fought for the passage of a law that would 
facilitate the trial of Dole and other companies in Nicaragua for their 
involvement in exposing laborers to DBCP and frustrate the corporate 
defendants’ use of FNC in the United States.11
Of all the foreign plaintiffs denied access to U.S. courts under FNC, 
tens of thousands have been DBCP plaintiffs from around the world.12
The Nicaraguan legislature designed Special Law 364 to handle DBCP 
cases involving Nicaraguan citizens. In essence, the law makes 
Nicaraguan courts more punitive than U.S. courts for corporations such 
as Dole.13 As a result, it is no longer in the corporation’s best interest for 
its attorneys to assert FNC. Instead of Nicaraguan courts, Dole’s local 
courts in California have become the more “convenient” forum for 
litigating claims brought by DBCP-affected individuals from 
Nicaragua.14
With the FNC legal tactic successfully neutralized by Special Law 
364, the door opened for the first-ever DBCP trial enabling foreign 
plaintiffs to claim harm and seek damages in a lawsuit brought before an 
9 Vicent Boix & Susanna R. Bohme, Commentary, Secrecy and Justice in the Ongoing Saga 
of DBCP Litigation, 18 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 154 (2012), available at
www.bananasthemovie.com/wp-content/uploads/resources/IJOEH_Boix_Bohme_2012.pdf. 
10 Id. at 155. 
11 Bohme, Pesticide Regulation, supra note 7, at 174-75. 
12 Id. at 173. 
13 See Paul Santoyo, Comment, Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have Dealt Forum 
Non Conveniens a Fatal Blow Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to Achieving Corporate 
Accountability, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 703, 729-33 (2005). 
14 As Susanna Bohme explains, when plaintiffs began seeking enforcement of Nicaraguan 
verdicts in U.S. courts, “corporate lawyers reversed their previous position that the Nicaraguan law 
and Nicaraguan courts were appropriate to the trial of DB[C]P case[s]. Now, the corporations argued 
the cases could not be enforced in the U.S. because Law 364 was deeply incompatible with U.S. 
legal culture. For example, Dow’s spokesperson maintained the law ‘offends virtually every notion 
Americans have of fair play and substantial justice’ because, among other reasons, it was retroactive, 
violated due process, and selectively targeted just a few companies. This move seemed especially 
cynical in light of the fact that the company had previously argued that US legal norms shouldn’t 
apply to Nicaraguan DBCP case. Now, it sought to use those very norms to denigrate Nicaraguan 
laws.” Bohme, National Law, Transnational Justice?, supra note 7, at 15-16. 
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American court. The case was Tellez v. Dole Food Company.15 In 2004, 
individuals who worked on plantations in Nicaragua filed a lawsuit 
against Dole and Dow Chemical Company (Dow), the company that 
manufactured and sold DBCP to Dole.16 The foreign plaintiffs claimed 
they became sterile due to their exposure to the pesticide while working 
on Dole banana plantations in the 1970s.17
On November 5, 2007, a Los Angeles Superior Court jury, presided 
over by Judge Victoria Chaney, found Dole and Dow responsible for 
exposing six of the plaintiffs to DBCP.18 The jury awarded them $3.2 
million in damages.19 The jury also determined that Dole acted with 
“malice, fraud, and oppression.”20 On November 15, 2007, the jury 
awarded $2.5 million in punitive damages to five of the six plaintiffs.21
In a case viewed as a test of how well the U.S. legal system could 
respond to injuries inflicted abroad by U.S.-based multinational 
corporations, some legal observers considered the jury’s modest verdict 
an important victory in holding corporations accountable.22 Indeed, it 
marked the first time a U.S. jury had found Dole liable for its conduct 
outside of the United States, the L.A. Times reported at the time.23 The 
verdict was a “hopeful sign” for the over 5,000 foreign agricultural 
workers who had filed suit in U.S. courts over the use of DBCP by U.S. 
corporations.24 The verdict also boded well for two subsequent DBCP 
cases, Mejia v. Dole Food Company and Rivera v. Dole Food Company,
over which Judge Chaney also presided, given the overlapping nature of 
these cases and Tellez. 25
15 Bohme, Pesticide Regulation, supra note 7, at 176. 
16 See First Amended Complaint, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
L.A. Cnty. Sept. 7, 2004), 2004 WL 5468592. The number of plaintiffs varied, as they were 
transferred, dropped, and added between the Tellez, Mejia, and Rivera cases. But we estimate that 
there were between 40 and 60 plaintiffs representing several thousand injured banana workers. 
17 Id.
18 Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, 2008 WL 744052 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. 
Mar. 7, 2008) (trial order); id., 2008 WL 744051 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 7, 2008) (trial 
order); see John Spano, Dole Must Pay Farmworkers $3.2 Million, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, 
available at articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/06/local/me-dole6. 
19 Id.
20 John Spano, Executive Says “New Dole” Should Not Pay for Misdeeds of “Old Dole,”
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, available at articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/15/local/me-dole15. 
21 Banana Workers Win $2.5M in Dole Lawsuit, CBS NEWS, Nov. 16, 2007, available at
www.cbsnews.com/news/banana-workers-win-25m-in-dole-lawsuit/. 
22 Spano, supra note 18. 
23 Id.
24 Id.; Banana Workers Win $2.5M in Dole Lawsuit, supra note 21. 
25 See Written Ruling, Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049, at 5 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. 
Cnty. June 15, 2009). 
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The historic Tellez jury verdict, however, was later vacated.26
Dole’s attorneys engineered a stunning comeback in the Mejia and
Rivera cases. Like the Tellez case, these cases were brought on behalf of 
Nicaraguan banana plantation workers who claimed they were made 
sterile from their exposure to DBCP over three decades ago while 
working on Dole banana farms.27 But unlike Tellez, they never reached a 
jury trial.  
On June 15, 2009, Judge Chaney dismissed them both with 
prejudice, determining that a vast conspiracy had been orchestrated by 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers, Nicaraguan judges, and others to defraud Dole 
and U.S. courts.28 Judge Chaney’s dismissal set the stage for Dole’s later 
comeback in Tellez, when on March 11, 2011, Judge Chaney vacated the 
Tellez jury verdict and dismissed the case with prejudice.29 This ruling 
came as the outcome of a coram vobis hearing, which is an extraordinary 
remedy available to victims of fraud.30 Judge Chaney’s coram vobis
ruling was appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, 
under the name Laguna v. Dole Food Company, with Steve Condie 
representing the six Nicaraguan appellants.31
In this Article, we explore the rollback of the jury’s verdicts. In 
doing so, we focus on the legal defense strategy that Dole’s attorneys 
employed after the Tellez jury verdict. We show that the strategy aimed 
to discredit the DBCP plaintiffs, as well as Nicaraguan legal institutions, 
and that Judge Chaney facilitated this strategy by disabling the 
adversarial process. We then review evidence that challenges Dole’s 
version of events and suggests that Judge Chaney’s method of evaluating 
evidence was flawed. Finally, we analyze the various biases Judge 
Chaney demonstrated during the course of the trials, which we believe 
contributed to her amenability to Dole’s defense strategy and ultimately 
placed the foreign plaintiffs at an unfair disadvantage. 
Before proceeding, we want to emphasize that the conclusions 
26 Id.
27 See Armin Rosencranz et al., Doling Out Environmental Justice to Nicaraguan Banana 
Workers: The Jose Adolfo Tellez v. Dole Food Company Litigation in the U.S. Courts, 3 GOLDEN 
GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 161 (2009). 
28 Written Ruling, Mejia, No. BC340049, at 1-2, 58 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. June 15, 
2009). 
29 See Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, 2008 WL 744052 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. 
Mar. 7, 2008) (trial order), rev’d on other grounds, Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., 
No. BC312852 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 2011). 
30 Id. at 45-48. 
31 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 4-5; Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 
2014 WL 891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. 
S217842). 
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drawn in this Article are provisional. Much of the evidence in this case is 
not publicly available and the legal documents for these cases are 
redacted because of a protective order that Judge Chaney entered 
following the Tellez jury verdict. We acknowledge the possibility that the 
further release of the record may present challenges to our conclusions 
on Dole’s strategy and Judge Chaney’s handling of the case. But despite 
the evidentiary limitations, we believe that the available record supports 
our conclusions.  
Moreover, we believe it is important to raise them, especially in 
light of the fact that a jury verdict favorable to the plaintiffs was 
overturned. If nothing else, our hope is that this Article will draw other 
scholars’ attention to the defendant’s aggressive strategy and the 
possibility of judicial bias in this case. 
II. POST-TELLEZ JURY VERDICT ROLLBACK
Two important events took place in the immediate aftermath of the 
November 2007 Tellez jury verdict. First, Judge Chaney modified the 
compensatory damages verdict and denied punitive damages against 
Dole, thereby reducing the overall verdict of $5.8 million to $1.58 
million.32 In her view, the jury did not correctly apply the law and there 
were insufficient facts on which to base its punitive damages decision.33
On the matter of compensatory damages, Judge Chaney ultimately 
granted the defendant’s motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict (JNOV) regarding strict liability, because there was no evidence 
demonstrating that Dole was a seller or distributor of DBCP.34
Judge Chaney also granted the defendant’s motion for JNOV 
regarding punitive damages.35 Dole’s lawyers (Jones, Day, with lead 
counsel Frederick McKnight) made the distinction between the “old 
Dole” of 1977 and the “new Dole” of today, arguing that the “new Dole” 
should not be punished for what the “old Dole” had done.36 They 
claimed that the “new Dole” does not place concern for production and 
profits over worker and environmental safety, and mentioned that only 
one of the top executives employed by the firm in 1977 remains with the 
company today.37 Judge Chaney accepted this line of reasoning and 
32 Rosencranz et al., supra note 27, at 174. 
33 Id. at 173. 
34 Id. at 174. 
35 Id.
36 Id. at 172. 
37 Id.
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concluded that awarding punitive damages as a means of punishment 
would be “arbitrary.”38 She also determined that California did not have 
an interest in punishing “a domestic corporation for injuries that occurred 
only in a foreign country.”39
The second important event following the Tellez jury verdict, but 
before Judge Chaney’s JNOVs, was Dole informing the court of “a 
witness, later designated ‘Witness X,’ who claimed to be aware” of a 
fraudulent scheme perpetrated on U.S. courts by the plaintiffs’ co-
counsel, Juan Dominguez from Los Angeles, Dominguez’s Nicaraguan 
colleague, Antonio Ordeñana, and their agents in Nicaragua.40 The 
witness did not implicate the plaintiffs’ other counsel, Duane Miller and 
other attorneys with the Sacramento firm Miller, Axline & Sawyer 
(MAS).
Witness X alleged that at least two of the Tellez plaintiffs never 
worked on banana farms and that they submitted false documentary 
evidence and perjured testimony to the court.41 Witness X also expressed 
concern for his safety and life, leading the court to enter a “protective 
order” on January 17, 2008, to preserve the witness’s anonymity.42 Dole 
asked for a new trial based on this alleged fraud. But Judge Chaney 
rejected it, concluding the witness’s statements constituted “inadmissible 
hearsay.”43
While Dole’s attorneys’ attempt to retry the Tellez case following 
the jury verdict was initially unsuccessful, the introduction of Witness X 
under the conditions of a protective order laid the groundwork for their 
subsequent victories in two other cases, Mejia and Rivera.
A. THE MEJIA PROCEEDINGS: DOLE IMPLEMENTS “CONTAMINATION”
LEGAL DEFENSE
The introduction of Witness X marked the launching of an unusual 
legal defense employed by Dole’s attorneys, who were from the law firm 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher became 
associated as counsel during the post-trial period in late 2007 and 
replaced Jones, Day in 2008.) Their strategy was to destroy the 
38 Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, 2008 WL 744052 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. 
Mar. 7, 2008) (trial order). 
39 See Tellez, No. BC312852, 2008 WL 744051. 
40 Written Ruling, Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049, at 7 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. 
June 15, 2009). 
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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credibility of the Nicaraguan DBCP plaintiffs and their attorneys and 
supporters, and to paint Nicaraguan society—its government, legal 
system, and people—as utterly corrupt. By discrediting every connection 
to the Nicaraguan DBCP cases, Dole’s attorneys’ strategy aimed to 
convince Judge Chaney that none of these cases would be able to stand 
on their own merits in U.S. courts. Dole’s attorneys successfully 
implemented this strategy during the Mejia proceedings, which occurred 
from October 2008 to April 23, 2009, the final day of the dismissal 
hearings.44 Judge Chaney issued her written ruling on June 15, 2009.45
The primary instrument for the strategy was testimony that Dole’s 
attorneys obtained from anonymous witnesses from Nicaragua. This 
testimony, together with “evidence” gathered by Dole’s investigators, 
from Texas-based Investigative Research Inc., presented a story of a vast 
conspiracy. The supposed conspiracy involved the lawyers representing 
the plaintiffs at the time, primarily Juan Dominguez from Los Angeles, 
Antonio Ordeñana from Nicaragua, and their agents in Nicaragua. They 
allegedly worked in concert with corrupt Nicaraguan judges and medical 
labs to recruit fraudulent plaintiffs, to assist them in obtaining false lab 
reports confirming their sterility, and to “coach” them to lie about 
working on banana farms. Furthermore, Dominguez and his supposed 
co-conspirators allegedly relied on obstruction, intimidation, and threats 
of violence to prevent anyone from blowing the whistle about their 
campaign to defraud Dole in U.S. courts.46
During the Mejia proceedings, Dole’s version of events passed 
through the judicial process largely uncontested, primarily as a result of 
Judge Chaney’s compromising the adversarial judicial process. The 
fateful moment occurred on October 6, 2008, when Judge Chaney 
granted Dole’s attorneys’ motion for a protective order that, like the 
protective order entered on behalf of Witness X, preserved the 
anonymity of three “John Doe” witnesses.47 A month later the court 
44 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at ii-xv (setting forth the factual and 
procedural history of the case). This Article treats October 2008 as the start of the Mejia
proceedings, because the trial court granted Dole’s motion to take secret depositions of Nicaraguan 
witnesses for the Mejia v. Dole case on October 6, 2008. See id. at v. 
45 Written Ruling, Mejia, No. BC340049, at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. June 15, 2009). 
46 See Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 6-14; Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049 
(Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Apr. 23, 2009) (setting forth a detailed description of the “heinous 
conspiracy”); Written Ruling, Mejia, No. BC340049, at 1-4, 41-48 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. June 
15, 2009); Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, at 11–25 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 
WL 891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. 
S217842). 
47 See Written Ruling, Mejia, No. BC340049, at 8-13 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. June 15, 
8
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amended the protective order to extend to additional John Doe 
depositions.48 Dole’s attorneys took depositions from a total of seventeen 
John Doe witnesses.49
The attorneys argued the order was necessary because they had 
witnesses who knew about the alleged conspiracy but would not come 
forward in U.S. courts out of fear that Dominguez and his Nicaraguan 
agents would intimidate or even harm them if their identities became 
public knowledge.50 By entering the protective order, Judge Chaney 
prevented Dominguez, Ordeñana, and the public from learning the names 
of the John Doe witnesses.51 They were not allowed to face their 
accusers. The protective order did not apply to the plaintiffs’ other 
counsel, Duane Miller and other attorneys with MAS, but it inhibited 
their ability to engage in effective investigation and cross-examination.52
The admission of John Doe testimony under non-adversarial 
conditions appears to have had two significant effects. First, it gave Dole 
the opportunity to attack the plaintiffs’ counsel.53 Second, it left Judge 
Chaney to determine the veracity of the story Dole’s attorneys pushed 
through, which expanded during the course of the proceedings. After 
Dole’s attorneys implicated Dominguez and Ordeñana in the 
“conspiracy,” they attempted to connect Duane Miller and other 
attorneys from MAS to the fraudulent scheme.  
On December 22, 2008, Dole filed a motion for sanctions against 
the MAS attorneys, accusing them of tampering with witnesses and 
2009); Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez, No. BC312852, at 6-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 
2011). 
48 Written Ruling, Mejia, No. BC340049, at 11 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. June 15, 2009). 
49 Id. at 12. 
50 Id. at 9, 11-12. 
51 According to Judge Chaney, “Dominguez was later granted access to John Does 1-3.” 
Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez, No. BC312852, at 7 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 2011). 
52 Steve Condie provides a detailed account of how the protective order inhibited MAS from 
contesting Dole’s version of events. See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 62-63, 76-79, 
81-82, 92-96, 98-101, 119-28. Close observers of these cases agree that the procedure instituted by 
Judge Chaney allowed Dole to push through its version of events uncontested. Vicent Boix and 
Susanna R. Bohme write, “[T]hese cases should not have [been] dismissed on the basis of 
undisclosed and uncountered testimony. Moving forward, the appellate court considering Tellez
should reject the notion that secret evidence can form a legitimate basis to reverse a decision duly 
made by a California jury. All courts hearing DBCP cases should ensure that all evidence is heard 
and refuse to allow secrecy to interfere with the administration of justice.” Boix & Bohme, supra
note 9, at 159. 
53 One of the key anonymous witnesses, “John Doe 17,” claims that Dole’s strategy was to 
neutralize the opposing counsel. In Condie’s appellants brief, he cites the following statement from 
the witness: “The biggest problem they have are the lawyers. First they went for Dominguez and 
now Provost.” The witness is quoted further: “[T]heir first action is to get rid of the law firms, 
because they don’t want lawyers . . . .” Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 343. 
9
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esentation. 
leaking secret information.54 The motion was later dropped.55 Dole’s 
attorneys also implicated lawyers with the Texas law firm Provost 
Umphrey and their associate, Benton Musslewhite, who were involved in 
DBCP litigation in Texas.56 During the hearings, the plaintiffs 
discharged Dominguez,57 which left MAS attorneys (who did not speak 
Spanish) as their sole counsel. Unable to effectively investigate and 
cross-examine the John Doe testimony and faced with allegations from 
Dole about their supposed involvement in the “conspiracy,” MAS was 
neutralized, leaving the plaintiffs without meaningful repr
With the attorneys effectively sidelined, Judge Chaney relied on 
demeanor evidence to determine the veracity of the John Doe testimony. 
She found the John Doe testimony to be credible, “[b]ased not only on 
the words spoken but also on the nonverbal cues, such as tone of voice, 
rapidity of response, body posture and facial expression.”58 She 
concluded there was “clear and convincing evidence” that the plaintiffs 
and their counsel, Dominguez and Ordeñana (not MAS), committed 
fraud on the court and on Dole59 and that Dominguez and his agents 
created an “atmosphere of intimidation and fear”60 through threats of 
violence, which prevented anyone from speaking out about the “illegal 
schemes brewing in Nicaragua.”61 Judge Chaney filed a complaint 
against Dominguez with the State Bar of California.62
Moreover, Judge Chaney’s oral ruling was unusual in its language 
and scope. She stated that the campaign of fraud was made possible 
because of Nicaragua’s “particular odd social ecosystem.”63 She likened 
the alleged campaign to a mythical “chimera,” a “fire-breathing she 
54 Id. at 93, 100. 
55 Id. at 93. 
56 Id. at 7-8, 178-81, 221. 
57 Id. at 119. 
58 Judge Chaney described the criteria she used to assess the veracity of John Doe witnesses 
depositions from Mejia in her written ruling for the Tellez coram vobis proceedings. See Coram 
Vobis Ruling, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, at 28 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 
2011), rev’d on other grounds, Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 WL 891268 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. S217842). 
59 Written Ruling, Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049, at 1-2, 58 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. 
Cnty. June 15, 2009). 
60 Id. at 57. 
61 Id. at 4, 43-50, 57. 
62 Amanda Bronstad, California State Bar Drops Complaint Against Attorney Who Sued 
Dole, CORPORATE COUNSEL,
www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202488692576&California_State_Bar_Drop
s_Complaint_Against_Attorney_Who_Sued_Dole&slreturn=20130517145602 (last visited June 17, 
2013). 
63 Transcript of Record at 3, supra note 1, at 3. 
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monster with a head of a lion, a body of a goat, and a tail of a snake.”64
Thus, for Judge Chaney, the conspiracy was a product not only of those 
who directly participated in the scheme, but also the general dysfunction 
of Nicaraguan society, which she determined was marred by corrupt 
legal institutions and a general lack of respect for the rule of law in the 
country.65
While Judge Chaney did not accept every aspect of Dole’s story, 
enough passed through for the corporation to achieve the goal of its 
defense—to destroy the credibility of all the Nicaragua DBCP lawsuits. 
As Judge Chaney explained, “Because of the interrelationships of the law 
firms and plaintiff groups in all DBCP cases in and emanating from 
Nicaragua, the taint of the fraud proven in this case permeates and 
discredits all such cases.”66 This determination compelled her to take the 
unusual step of contacting U.S. District Court Judge Paul C. Huck, who 
presided over another Nicaraguan DBCP case, Osorio v. Dole Food 
Company. That case involved plaintiffs seeking enforcement of a 
Nicaraguan verdict in a Miami federal court. In October 2009, Judge 
Huck declined to enforce the Nicaraguan decision, but his reasons did 
not include the fraud found by Judge Chaney.67
B. DOLE ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS DOCUMENTARY
The Nicaraguan DBCP claimants’ struggle in U.S. courts was the 
subject of a documentary called BANANAS!*: ON TRIAL FOR MALICE,68
which was directed by Swedish documentary filmmaker and journalist, 
Fredrik Gertten. Dole’s attorneys attempted to suppress the documentary. 
Their efforts demonstrate the extent to which both MAS was neutralized 
and Dole would attack any supporting link to the DBCP cases. On July 8, 
2009, Dole sued the filmmakers, claiming the film, the contents of the 
website, and statements made by Gertten when speaking about the 
documentary amounted to defamation.69 The crux of Dole’s defamation 
allegation was that the film excluded any mention of the court’s finding 
64 Id. at 5. 
65 Written Ruling, Mejia, No. BC340049, at 22-26 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. June 15, 
2009). 
66 Id. at 53. 
67 See Order Denying Recognition of Judgment, Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 
1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co.,635 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam). 
68 See Bananas!*, BANANAS THE MOVIE, www.bananasthemovie.com/ (last visited Mar. 11, 
2014). 
69 See Complaint for Defamation, Dole Food Co., v. Gertten, No. BC417435 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
L.A. Cnty. July 8, 2009). 
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of fraud.70
The complaint came about a month after the film premiered at the 
Film Independent’s Los Angeles Film Festival.71 Dole’s attorneys made 
efforts to prevent Gertten from releasing the film. In fact, during the 
Mejia proceedings, MAS agreed to send a letter to the filmmaker 
discouraging him from releasing the film, a gesture of which Judge 
Chaney approved.72 After screening the documentary, the Film Festival 
pulled it from the documentary competition, saying that the filmmakers 
relied on “unreliable evidence” and that the trial judge in Tellez
uncovered the alleged fraudulent scheme.73
When the filmmakers mounted a defense to Dole’s defamation 
lawsuit, Dole dropped the suit.74 The filmmakers filed a motion seeking 
to recoup defense costs under the California SLAPP (strategic lawsuit 
against public participation) statute.75 On November 17, 2010, a Los 
Angeles Superior Court determined that Dole’s suit was a SLAPP suit; it 
lacked “minimal merit;” and Dole was ordered to pay attorney fees and 
other associated costs.76
C. THE TELLEZ CORAM VOBIS PROCEEDINGS: DOLE’S STORY BEGINS 
TO UNRAVEL
On May 19, 2009, a month after the Mejia dismissal hearings, 
Dole’s attorneys petitioned the appellate court for a writ of error coram
vobis, alleging a massive campaign of fraud orchestrated by Dominguez, 
Ordeñana, and the Tellez plaintiffs.77 On July 7, 2009, the appellate court 
70 Id., at 2; Amanda Bronstad, Dole Food Sues Filmmakers, Alleging Documentary Was 
Based on Fraud, NAT’L L.J. (July 8, 2009), available at
www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202432119262&Dole_Food_sues_filmmakers_allegin
g_documentary_was_based_on_fraud_&slreturn=20130515143512. 
71 Bronstad, supra note 70.
72 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 128. 
73 Bronstad, supra note 70.
74 See Notice of Motion, Dole Food Co., v. Gertten, No. BC417435 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. 
Cnty. Sept. 10, 2009) (notice of motion and special motion of defendants Fredrik Gertten, Margaret 
Jangard, and WG Film AB to strike under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16; supporting 
memorandum of points and authorities); Order on Special Motion, Dole Food Co., v. Gertten, No. 
BC417435 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Nov. 17, 2010) (order on special motion to strike and motion 
for attorney fees), 2, 3, 11. 
75 See Cross-Complaint, Dole Food Co., v. Gertten, BC417435 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. 
Sept. 10, 2009) (cross-complaint of wg film ab against dole food company, inc. for intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage). 
76 Order on Special Motion, Dole Food Co., v. Gertten, No. BC417435 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. 
Cnty. Nov. 17, 2010) (order on special motion to strike and motion for attorney fees). 
77 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 134; see also Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez 
v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 2011), rev’d on other 
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remanded the Tellez action to Judge Chaney’s court and ordered the 
plaintiffs to show cause why the previous judgment should not be 
vacated and why the case should not be dismissed with prejudice.78 In 
August 2009, Steve Condie took over as the counsel for the six Tellez
plaintiffs.79 The trial court presided over a year-long evidentiary hearing. 
The Tellez coram vobis proceedings occurred from June 2009 to July 15, 
2010, when Judge Chaney delivered her oral ruling vacating the verdict 
and dismissing the case with prejudice.80 She issued her written ruling on 
March 11, 2011.81
These proceedings were consistent with the Mejia proceedings in 
three general respects. First, they were conducted under constrained and 
non-adversarial conditions, for Judge Chaney maintained a version of the 
protective order throughout the course of the proceedings, which 
undermined Condie’s ability to investigate the witnesses and their 
stories.82 (Also, Judge Chaney denied Condie’s request to re-depose two 
of the crucial anonymous witnesses, whose testimony was proven to be 
unreliable.)83
Second, Dole’s attorneys continued their legal defense strategy, 
which included attacking the opposing counsel. For example, they filed a 
motion for sanctions against Steve Condie, accusing him of assisting 
Dominguez and Ordeñana in their “intimidation” of John Doe 
witnesses.84 Third, Judge Chaney maintained that the Tellez claim was 
the product of a campaign of fraud. However, Judge Chaney’s Tellez
ruling is more circumscribed than her Mejia ruling. This outcome can be 
attributed to the evidence introduced during the proceedings that 
challenged aspects of Dole’s version of events as well as the veracity of 
the John Doe witness testimony. 
Judge Chaney conceded that the conspiracy was not as vast as she 
initially thought. In her Mejia ruling, the conspiracy story is bolstered 
with an account of a secret meeting in Chinandega, Nicaragua, that took 
grounds, Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 WL 891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), 
petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. S217842). 
78 Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez, No. BC312852, at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 
2011). 
79 Id. at 3. 
80 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at ii-xv (setting forth the factual and 
procedural history of the case). 
81 Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez, No. BC312852, at 51 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 
2011). 
82 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 136-41. 
83 Id. at 151-55, 177-91. Condie details his motion to re-depose John Does 17 and 18 and 
GDC and Judge Chaney’s various responses to this motion. 
84 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 181-82. 
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place in March 2003.85 Judge Chaney found that at this meeting, 
Nicaraguan Judge Socorro Toruño, representatives from laboratories, and 
the Nicaraguan and U.S. lawyers “conspired to manufacture evidence of 
sterility and thereby ‘fix’ [the DBCP] cases in Nicaraguan courts.”86
Based on “detailed, undisputed testimony” from anonymous witnesses, 
she concluded that Dominguez, the plaintiffs’ Nicaraguan counsel, 
Benton Musslewhite, and Mark Sparks from Provost Umphrey, and 
others attended the meeting.87
The anonymous witnesses’ testimony was later disputed. Both 
Sparks and Musslewhite denied participating in the alleged meeting. 
Musslewhite presented his passport, which proved that he was not in 
Nicaragua at the time of the alleged meeting.88 In light of his passport 
and testimony, Judge Chaney reversed her judgment and determined that 
Musslewhite “did not participate in such a meeting” in her Tellez coram 
vobis ruling.89
She also concluded that Sparks did not participate “in the plaintiffs’ 
fraud in this case.”90 According to Musslewhite, the meeting was “a big 
lie” and a “tragic example . . . [of] a power-play by a big corporation like 
Dole.”91 Additional evidence suggests Musslewhite is correct. 
In their article on the DBCP litigation, Susan Bohme and Vicent 
Boix state that Judge Toruño, the supposed “brain” behind the meeting, 
and a laboratory analyst claim they were not present at the supposed 
meeting.92 The authors also draw attention to an important discrepancy: 
One of the main purposes of the alleged meeting was to fix the medical 
results for the plaintiffs. Forty percent were supposed to have the most 
severe type of infertility, while thirty percent would show infertility of a 
less severe type, and another thirty percent would show other damages. 
Yet the plaintiffs’ sterility breakdown departed drastically from these 
percentages.93
85 Written Ruling, Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049, at 29 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. 
June 15, 2009). 
86 Id.
87 Id. at 29. 
88 See Boix & Bohme, supra note 9, at 157. 
89 Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, at 21 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. 
Cnty. Mar. 11, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 WL 
891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. S217842). 
90 Id.
91 Amanda Bronstad, Litigation Fraud Allegations Hotly Disputed in Dole Banana Case,
NAT’L L. J. (Feb. 1, 2010), 
www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202441775977. 
92 See Boix & Bohme, supra note 9, at 157. 
93 Id.; see also Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 83. 
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Moreover, the authors claim that there was severe internal conflict 
among the plaintiffs’ groups. Boix was present at a gathering of DBCP 
victims in Managua in May 2003, around the same time as the alleged 
meeting. Boix observed that the disagreements were so strong that the 
groups could not sit at the same table.94
Other aspects of Dole’s story were challenged during the Tellez 
coram vobis proceedings. These challenges also raised questions about 
the reliability of the anonymous witnesses’ testimony. On May 15, 2010, 
the Associated Press reported on a news conference in Nicaragua, where 
seven workers accused Dole of bribing them for the purpose of casting 
doubt on the DBCP claims.95 One of them reportedly said, “What they 
wanted was for me to testify that the tests had been altered, that they had 
not worked on the banana plantation, and that for saying what they 
wanted, they would give me $225,000.”96 Others have testified in 
Nicaraguan legal proceedings, claiming Dole’s agents offered them 
money to deny that plaintiffs had worked on banana farms.97
Dole’s attorneys claimed that the lead conspirators coerced the 
seven workers into supporting the plaintiffs’ cause. However, the 
available evidence also casts doubt on Dole’s claim that Dominguez and 
his agents relied on threats of violence and intimidation as a linchpin for 
the fraudulent scheme. For example, an independent filmmaker, Jason 
Glaser, who performed investigative work for Provost Umphrey98 and 
directed and produced a documentary on the injustices in the banana 
industry called BANANA LAND,99 attended the May 14, 2010, press 
conference.100 In his testimony, which Judge Chaney “found credible,”101
he stated, “None of [the seven workers at the news conference] appeared 
to be afraid or intimidated and all appeared to be present voluntarily.”102
94 Boix & Bohme, supra note 9, at 157. 
95 Marcos Aleman, Nicaraguan Workers Deny Conspiracy Against Dole, GUARDIAN, May 
15, 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9079347. 
96 Id.
97 See Boix & Bohme, supra note 9, at 158 (testimony from Nicaragua’s legal procedure 
called “Absolucion de Posiciones”). 
98 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 7. 
99 The Filmmakers, BANANA LAND, www.bananalandmovie.org/the-filmmakers/ (last visited
Feb. 14, 2014). 
100 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 190. 
101 Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, at 12 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. 
Cnty. Mar. 11, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 WL 
891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. S217842). 
102 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 190. In a personal interview with one of 
the authors, Glaser stated, “They weren’t afraid at all.” Interview by Stephen Roblin with Jason 
Glaser, Dir., Producer, BANANA LAND (Nov. 17, 2013). 
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Glaser is arguably in a unique position to weigh in authoritatively 
on the competing claims. In their extensive investigation for Provost 
Umphrey, Glaser and his colleagues interviewed some of the plaintiffs, 
secret witnesses, and other actors involved in this case.103 In fact, 
Condie’s appellate brief relied heavily on Glaser’s evidence.104
Glaser doubts Dole’s allegations concerning the supposed threats of 
violence and intimidation. For example, he does not believe anyone was 
in danger from Ordeñana.105 Moreover, he attended a demonstration 
organized by pro-plaintiff activists, who denounced the secret 
recruitment of witnesses by Dole’s agents.106 Dole’s attorneys used the 
demonstration to bolster the “atmosphere of intimidation” claim by 
alleging demonstrators threatened Dole’s agents.107 According to Glaser, 
“I saw indignation with the fact that [p]eople were being manipulated. I 
did not see . . . the desire to cause harm.”108
Despite the challenges to Dole’s version of events and the proven 
unreliability of aspects of the anonymous witnesses’ testimony, Judge 
Chaney still ruled against the banana farm workers, believing a campaign 
of fraud was committed on Dole and the court, though it involved fewer 
actors. She also defended her decision to exercise broad authority in 
entering the protective order, which the plaintiffs argued deprived them 
of due process.109 Moreover, Judge Chaney attributed the fraudulent 
scheme to “a confluence of social, political, and legal factors in 
Nicaragua.”110
In fact, her Tellez coram vobis ruling expanded on her earlier 
assessment in the Mejia ruling with respect to the connection between 
the conditions in Nicaragua and the scheme. The factors she cited 
include: the “disarray” of Nicaragua’s courts, the effects of Special Law 
364, the general conditions of poverty in the country, the country’s 
“highly politicized atmosphere,” and Nicaragua’s supposed political 
103 Interview with Jason Glaser, supra note 102. 
104 Id.
105 Id.; see also Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 114. 
106 Interview with Jason Glaser, supra note 102; see also Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra
note 2, at 194. 
107 See Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, at 16-18 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 
2014 WL 891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. 
S217842); see also Written Ruling, Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049, at 12-19, 48-49 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. June 15, 2009). 
108 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 118, 193-96. 
109 Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez, No. BC312852, at 30-34 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 
2011). 
110 Id. at 25-27. 
16
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol7/iss2/4
2014] TELLEZ V. DOLE 129 
isolation from other countries in the Western Hemisphere.111 She also 
cites Judge Huck’s judgment in his Osorio ruling that the Nicaraguan 
judicial system “does not provide procedures compatible with due 
process of law.”112
On March 25, 2011, two weeks after Judge Chaney issued her 
Tellez coram vobis written ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Judge Huck’s ruling.113 But the Eleventh 
Circuit did not affirm Judge Huck’s disparagement of Nicaragua’s 
judicial system. It expressly dropped Judge Huck’s assertion regarding 
Nicaragua’s lack of impartial tribunals.114
D. THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA RAISES ADDITIONAL DOUBTS
The views of the State Bar of California raised additional doubts 
about both Dole’s version of events and the reliability of Judge Chaney’s 
process. The California State Bar investigated the allegation concerning 
Dominguez’s misconduct in the case. On March 1, 2011, ten days before 
Judge Chaney issued her written ruling for the Tellez coram vobis
proceedings, the Bar cleared him of wrongdoing, stating “the allegations 
of professional misconduct” do not “warrant further action.”115
A month later, the State Bar also closed a complaint filed by Condie 
against Dole’s counsel.116 The State Bar stated that much of the 
information on which Condie’s complaint was based was subject to the 
protective order, and even if the Bar had been a party to the order, the 
order would have prevented it from “actually using that information in 
any meaningful way.”117 The State Bar further stated, “[T]here have 
already been judicial findings related to the issues . . . raised. Those 
findings could be difficult to overcome for purposes of our 
proceedings.”118 As Susanne Bohme and Vicent Boix pointed out, “The 
bar’s primary obstacle to undertaking an investigation of the Dole 
111 Id.
112 Id. at 26; see also Order Denying Recognition of Judgment, Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 
F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co., 635 F.3d 1277 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
113 Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co., 635 F. 3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
114 Id.
115 Letter from William E. Graham Jr., Investigator, State Bar of Cal., to Susan Lynn 
Margolis, Margolis & Margolis LLP (Mar. 1, 2011), available at www.bananasthemovie.com/wp-
content/uploads/resources/dominguez_closing_letter.pdf. 
116 Letter from James E. Towery & Lelanie J. Lawrence to Robert S. Condie (Feb. 16, 2011) 
(on file with The State Bar of California). 
117 Id.
118 Id.
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attorneys—the secrecy of witness testimony—is the same obstacle that 
has prevented full access to justice for the Nicaraguan plaintiffs.”119
III. LAGUNA V. DOLE: TELLEZ CORAM VOBIS APPEALED
Judge Chaney’s coram vobis ruling was appealed to the Court of 
Appeal of the State of California, under the name Laguna v. Dole Food 
Company.120 The plaintiffs’ attorney, Steve Condie, submitted a detailed 
346-page opening brief, in which he put forth a three-part argument. 
First, he argued that the process instituted by Judge Chaney in Mejia and
the Tellez coram vobis case constituted an abuse of judicial discretion 
that “destroyed the reliability of the court’s fact-finding function and 
[ultimately] violated the appellants’ right to due process of law.”121
Second, he argued that Dole did not meet the requirements of the writ of 
error coram vobis.122 Third, he alleged that Judge Chaney derogated 
Nicaraguan society—its people, lawyers, judges, and judicial 
processes—and that this represented “an injudicious inclination to 
perceive wrongdoing in events in a foreign country which the court 
simply did not understand and undermines the credibility of our judicial 
system.”123
Condie’s brief emphasized how all but one of the key questions was 
never in doubt. During the Tellez case, the following facts had already 
been proven: the dangers of DBCP, Dole’s decision to use the pesticide 
despite its knowledge of these dangers, and that the plaintiffs suffered 
health impairment that DBCP caused. In fact, American labs tested the 
six plaintiffs and verified their medical conditions.124 Therefore, in 
119 Boix & Bohme, supra note 9, at 159. 
120 Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 WL 891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), 
petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. S217842). 
121 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 211. 
122 Condie argued that Dole failed to meet the requirements for four reasons. First, “[a]ll of 
the facts upon which Dole based its petition were known to Dole before or during trial and could 
have been brought to the attention of the court before judgment was entered.” Id. at xxi; Second, 
“[t]here is no evidence that any factual issue underlying the judgment was wrongly decided other 
than the court’s improper readjudication of the jury’s findings as to two appellants based on its 
reassessment of the significance of their poor job of describing at trial events which happened 30 
years earlier.” Id. at xxii; Third, “[e]vidence of fraudulent conduct involving claims of other people 
(e.g., the Nicaraguan DBCP claims filed in Nicaragua) is not grounds for vacating the judgment won 
by these appellants in this case under coram vobis precedent.” Id. at xxii-xxiii; The fourth reason 
given by Condie is that  “[t]he things done by third parties which are cited as proof that appellants 
were implicated in ‘the fraud’ did not in any way affect the process or the outcome of the trial in this 
case.” Id. at xxiii; see also id. at 299-320. 
123 Id. at 323. 
124 Id. at 2, 16, 314, 319. 
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Condie’s view, the only remaining factual question was whether the 
plaintiffs worked on Dole banana farms in the 1970s.125 Instead of 
proving that the six plaintiffs had never worked on Dole farms, Dole’s 
attorneys convinced Judge Chaney that the question could never be 
conclusively answered. In her justification for denying a retrial, Judge 
Chaney observed, “There is no longer a reasonable probability that any 
party will ever get to the truth.”126
Dole’s attorneys responded to the appellants’ brief, arguing that the 
court should affirm the coram vobis judgment of dismissal.127 Dole 
claimed that the appellants’ attempts to reargue the evidence were 
improper and that the coram vobis requirements were met. They also 
rejected the appellants’ argument that the trial court violated their due 
process rights. Dole’s attorneys defended the protective order and the 
factfinding procedure Judge Chaney instituted.128 The California District 
Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court on March 7, 
2014.129 The appellants filed a petition for review by the California 
Supreme Court; that petition was pending as this Article went to press.130
IV. ANALYSIS
In this Part, we raise concerns about the factfinding process Judge 
Chaney instituted in the Mejia and the Tellez coram vobis hearings. We 
then discuss the various biases she manifested during the course of these 
proceedings. In our estimation, Dole’s attorneys exploited both this 
process and these biases in executing their “contamination” legal defense 
strategy. Ultimately, we are sympathetic to Condie’s argument that the 
plaintiffs were denied due process and that the results of the coram vobis
proceedings should be vacated. 
125 Id. at 314, 319-20. 
126 Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, at 51 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. 
Cnty. Mar. 11, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 WL 
891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. S217842). 
127 (Redacted Version) Respondent’s Brief for Dole Food Company at 114-17, Laguna v. 
Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 WL 891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review 
filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. S217842); see Respondent’s Brief for the Dow Chemical Co. at 29, 
Laguna, No. B233497, 2014 WL 891268, brief available at 2012 WL 6220576. 
128 Dole’s attorneys also argued that the court should affirm the coram vobis judgment on the 
separate and independent ground that the court has the inherent power to terminate a lawsuit when 
the plaintiff has engaged in egregious misconduct, necessitating dismissal to preserve fairness. See 
Respondent’s Brief for Dole Food Company at 114-17, No. B233497, 2014 WL 891268. 
129 Laguna, No. B233497, 2014 WL 891268, petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) 
(No. S217842). 
130 Laguna v. Dole Food. Co., (No. S217842) (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014). 
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ce.
A. UNRELIABLE FACTFINDING PROCESS
In our view, there are compelling reasons to question the factfinding 
process that Judge Chaney instituted in the Mejia and Tellez coram vobis
proceedings. As we explained above, the protective order she issued 
protected the identities of the seventeen John Doe witnesses and curtailed 
the plaintiffs’ counsel’s ability to engage in meaningful investigation and 
cross-examination. Judge Chaney then relied on demeanor evidence to 
determine the veracity of the John Doe testimony, which she based on 
the plaintiffs’ verbal and nonverbal cues, like tone of voice, rapidity of 
response, facial expression, and body posture.131
The fact that the scope of the conspiracy diminished from Judge 
Chaney’s Mejia ruling to the Tellez coram vobis ruling illustrates the 
unreliability of the anonymous witnesses’ testimony and the trial court’s 
method of discerning the truth. During the Tellez coram vobis
proceedings, aspects of this testimony, which Judge Chaney determined 
to be true, were proven false, such as the claim that Benton Musslewhite 
and Mark Sparks attended the alleged conspiracy meeting.132 In our 
view, this fact should have caused Judge Chaney to become concerned 
about the overall veracity of the anonymous witnesses’ testimony and the 
method she used to discern its veracity.  
Moreover, this fact raises two obvious questions: Why were some 
parts of the John Doe testimony reliable and others unreliable? And how 
did Judge Chaney determine this?133 Without convincing answers to 
these questions, we do not see how the factfinding process that she 
instituted can be seen as reliable. 
It also appears that Judge Chaney treated Jason Glaser’s testimony 
in an inconsistent manner. She relied on parts of Glaser’s testimony to 
buttress her ruling. For example, she cited his testimony to support the 
claim that Dominguez’s “captains” recruited false claimants.134
However, she disregarded his testimony when it contradicted the 
anonymous witnesses’ testimony and the allegations put forth by Dole’s 
attorneys, such as his refutation that Dominguez and Ordeñana knew that 
the “captains” were knowingly recruiting false claimants and that they 
used threats of intimidation and violen
131 See Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez, No. BC312852, at 28 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 
11, 2011). 
132 Id. at 21. 
133 Condie raised similar questions in his brief. See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, 
at 225. 
134 Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez, No. BC312852, at 12, 29 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 
2011). 
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Again, two obvious questions are raised: Why were some parts of 
Glaser’s testimony reliable and not others? And how did Judge Chaney 
determine this? In Glaser’s opinion, Judge Chaney essentially cherry-
picked his testimony to confirm what she already believed about the 
case.135
B. NEGATIVE CONCEPTION OF NICARAGUAN SOCIETY
Judge Chaney’s judicial performance in these cases has been 
described as “derogatory” and “paternalistic.”136 When examining her 
written and oral rulings and some of the decisions she made at key 
junctures during the proceedings, we believe it is clear that Judge Chaney 
demonstrated a negative conception of Nicaraguan society—its people, 
culture, government, and judicial system. This negative conception 
seems to have compelled her to draw erroneous conclusions. 
Judge Chaney’s distorted conception of Nicaraguan society became 
apparent during her Mejia oral ruling on April 23, 2009. As explained 
above, Judge Chaney likened the alleged conspiracy to a “heinous and 
repulsive” mythical “chimera” that was hatched in Nicaragua’s 
“particular odd social ecosystem.”137 Her oral ruling is riddled with 
phrases that can be interpreted as offensive and derogatory toward 
Nicaraguan society.138 Judge Chaney’s language leads us to believe that 
she held a negative and simplistic view of Nicaraguan society.139
Moreover, she made sweeping denunciations of Nicaraguan society. 
For example, she stated that the fraud offers “a sad commentary about 
the government and legal system in Nicaragua and the inability of the 
Nicaraguan system to bring justice and safety to its citizens.”140 Though 
she dropped the chimera analogy and softened her language in her 
subsequent rulings, Judge Chaney maintained the view that the alleged 
fraud was nurtured by the country’s broken judicial system and other 
135 Interview with Jason Glaser, supra note 102. 
136 Boix & Bohme, supra note 9, at 157. 
137 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 3, 6. 
138 For example, Judge Chaney stated, “Like many little critters in plants that live in those 
unique ecosystems . . . those animals and plants cannot survive outside of their ecosystem . . . [and] 
although there has been a strong attempt to bring the seeds of the Nicaraguan corruption here to this 
country, it has not succeeded, and if I have anything to say about it, it will not succeed.” Id. at 19. 
139 We find it striking that during Judge Chaney’s harsh denunciation of the plaintiffs’ society, 
she admitted to how little she knows about Nicaraguan society. At one point she stated, “The 
Sandinista Revolution changed the system of government there. I’m not quite sure what it’s been 
replaced with. I know there is a government there. I have no idea how well it’s really functioning.” 
Id. at 4. 
140 Id. at 25. 
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general societal conditions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit weighed in on 
the issue of Nicaragua’s judicial system and refused to accept that it 
lacks impartial tribunals.141 As stated above, Judge Chaney contacted 
Judge Huck, who presided over the Osorio case, to inform him of the 
supposed conspiracy. Judge Huck determined that Nicaragua lacks 
impartial tribunals, which Judge Chaney cited in her Tellez coram vobis
ruling, along with U.S. State Department reports.142
The Osorio plaintiffs appealed Judge Huck’s ruling in order to seek 
enforcement.143 While the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Judge Huck’s ruling 
on March 25, 2011, it expressly dropped Judge Huck’s assertion 
regarding Nicaragua’s lack of impartial tribunals.144 The appellate panel 
said, “We . . . affirm the district court’s judgment; however, we do not 
address the broader issue of whether Nicaragua as a whole ‘does not 
provide impartial tribunals’ and decline to adopt the district court’s 
holding on that question.”145
Judge Chaney’s views concerning Nicaragua’s legal system are also 
evinced in her response to testimony obtained by the “absoluciones”
legal process, which is a legal forum for courts to obtain testimony from 
citizens. Witnesses reported that Dole’s agents offered them money to 
deny that others had been banana workers, corroborating statements 
made by witnesses at the press conference and during Glaser’s numerous 
interviews, which he communicated to the court during the Tellez coram 
vobis hearings.146 Judge Chaney concluded in the Tellez coram vobis 
ruling that “the absoluciones lack any semblance of credibility.”147 Some 
of the reasons she provided were that questions are written by an 
interested party, the witness cannot be represented by counsel, and cross-
examination is not permitted.148
Judge Chaney’s judgment on the absoluciones procedure appears to 
suffer from her lack of knowledge about the Latin American legal 
141 Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co., 635 F. 3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
142 Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, at 25-27 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 
WL 891268 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. 
S217842). 
143 Osorio, 635 F. 3d 1277. 
144 Id. at 1279. 
145 Id.
146 See Boix & Bohme, supra note 9, at 158 (testimony from Nicaragua’s legal procedure 
called “Absolucion de Posiciones”); see also Interview with Jason Glaser, supra note 102. 
147 Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez, No. BC312852, at 29 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 
2011). 
148 Id. at 29-30. 
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context and her readiness to fall back on a negative conception of 
Nicaraguan institutions. According to Alejandro Garro, law professor at 
Columbia University and expert on Latin American legal systems, 
procedures for acquiring sworn testimony like absoluciones are common 
in Latin American judicial systems.149 In his view, while the procedure 
has its limits, there is no reason why the statements would be deemed 
unreliable.150
What is particularly striking is how Judge Chaney determined that 
“the John Doe witness testimony was all the more credible when 
contrasted with witness statements produced by plaintiffs, in particular 
the absoluciones,” a procedure that “renders them untrustworthy.”151
Thus, we are to believe not only that Judge Chaney’s method for 
determining the veracity of the John Doe testimony under non-
adversarial conditions—a method that failed to detect bogus testimony—
is more reliable than a legal procedure common to Latin America, but 
also that the absoluciones procedure somehow further validates this 
testimony. 
Judge Chaney also revealed her negative conception of Nicaraguan 
society by drawing disparaging conclusions about the Chinandega 
community. She concluded that the Chinandega community is 
exceptionally cohesive and that this characteristic, along with extreme 
poverty, compelled the community to unify behind the campaign to 
defraud Dole.152 She explained in her Tellez coram vobis ruling that the 
“collective mood of the community” functioned “as shields to obscure 
the truth and as swords to bring money into a very impoverished 
region.”153 Judge Chaney observed: 
Because of the extreme poverty in Nicaragua, the possibility that these 
DBCP lawsuits would bring money into impoverished communities 
encouraged members of the community to rally behind the claimants. 
A threat to one particular plaintiff was perceived as a threat to all. This 
adherence to the cause of “The Affected” impeded the defendants’ 
ability to obtain voluntary statements by individuals willing to speak 
149 Email from Alejandro Garro, Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law to 
(Mar. 19, 2013) (on file with author). 
150 Id.
151 Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez, No. BC312852, at 29 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 11, 
2011). 
152 Id. at 34, 41-42. 
153 Id. at 34. 
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in the open and on the record.154
Glaser challenged the “ridiculous” assumption about the 
community’s unity and cohesion during the Tellez coram vobis
proceedings, saying that there is “absolutely no unity in these cases.”155
We note that Judge Chaney’s coram vobis ruling occurred after 
Glaser’s testimony, which she found credible. This appears to be an 
example of her cherry-picking Glaser’s testimony to support the major 
aspects of Dole’s story, while ignoring his testimony when it did not 
conform to the story. Glaser’s depiction is consistent with Vicent Boix’s 
account of the May 2003 gathering he attended.156 He described the deep 
divisions and bitter hostility among various factions of the workers.157
Judge Chaney held on to the assumption of community solidarity in the 
face of counter-evidence, which helped Dole’s case. It would have been 
much more difficult to accept the story of a vast, community-wide 
conspiracy while acknowledging that the community lacked the 
necessary cohesion to pull off such a monumental campaign of fraud.  
Given Judge Chaney’s conception of the plaintiffs’ society, it is not 
surprising that she drew several other seemingly biased conclusions. For 
example, Judge Chaney’s fear of violence against witnesses was in part 
based on a traumatic past experience: a witness in her court from 
Colombia was murdered after testifying. According to Condie, Judge 
Chaney mentioned this incident several times and admitted that the 
experience made her “more sensitive than the average judge might 
be.”158
If she had had a better understanding of the crime situation in 
Nicaragua, perhaps she would have realized that the Colombia 
experience is irrelevant to a case involving plaintiffs and witnesses from 
Nicaragua. Unlike Colombia, which is one of the most dangerous 
countries in Latin America, Nicaragua is one of the safest.159 Moreover, 
154 Id. at 41-42. Condie’s brief quotes an earlier statement by Judge Chaney: “[T]he 
community of Chinandega has been portrayed to me as being a very close-knit community where 
one member of the community supports another member of the community absolutely.” See
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 237. 
155 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 138. 
156 Boix & Bohme, supra note 9, at 157. 
157 For a detailed description of the divisions within the movement, see Bohme, National Law, 
Transnational Justice?, supra note 7. 
158 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 244. 
159 To illustrate the disparity in violent crime between the two countries, Nicaragua’s 
homicide rate in 2011 was in the range of zero to ten deaths per 100,000 residents, whereas 
Colombia’s rate was “greater than 30.” See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, REGIONAL HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013-2014 CITIZEN SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE: EVIDENCE AND 
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despite the widespread “threats of violence” against Dole collaborators 
and the fact that some of the secret witnesses admitted to lying to 
undermine the plaintiffs’ cause, those witnesses today live openly in 
Nicaragua, and there have been no acts of violence committed against 
them to date, according to Glaser.160
C. PRO-U.S. CORPORATE BIAS
We believe Judge Chaney also, probably unconsciously, exhibited a 
pro-corporate bias. In our view, Judge Chaney made this bias apparent 
immediately after the Tellez jury verdict, when she accepted Dole’s 
attorney’s argument that the corporation should not pay punitive 
damages on grounds that California did not have an interest in punishing 
“a domestic corporation for injuries that occurred only in a foreign 
country” and that it was the “old Dole” that committed the abuses.161 On 
the matter of whether awarding punitive damages for injuries inflicted by 
Dole would serve any California interest, we agree with Susanna 
Bohme’s observation: “Like FNC decisions before it, the dismissal 
reinforced national boundaries to the benefit of transnational 
corporations by defining their activities abroad as outside the ‘interests’ 
of US law.”162
Dole’s attorneys argued that the “new Dole” was a much-reformed 
version of its former self.163 As such, it would not commit blatant human 
rights abuses in the pursuit of profit, as it did when taking advantage of 
the country’s exploitative operational environment and knowingly 
exposing its foreign workers to harmful chemicals.164 We argue that this 
PROPOSALS FOR LATIN AMERICA 5 (2013); see also Crime in Nicaragua: A Surprising Safe Haven,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2012, www.economist.com/node/21543492. 
160 Interview with Jason Glaser, supra note 102. 
161 Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, 2008 WL 744051 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. 
Mar. 7, 2008), rev’d on other grounds, Laguna v. Dole Food Co., No. B233497, 2014 WL 891268 
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2014), petition for review filed (Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. S217842); 
Rosencranz et al., supra note 27, at 172-74. 
162 Bohme, National Law, Transnational Justice?, supra note 7, at 34. 
163 Rosencranz et al., supra note 27, at 172-74.
164 Standard Fruit Company (now “Dole”) operated in Nicaragua during two periods: from 
1922 through the mid-1940s and from 1970 until 1982. The corporation also operated in the country 
during two U.S. military occupations (1912-1925 and 1926-1933), the Juan B. Sacasa administration 
(1933-1936), the Somoza family dictatorship (1937-1978), and the Sandinista Revolution (1979-
1990). In their recount of the history of Nicaragua, Thomas Walker and Christine Wade characterize 
the pre-Sandinista economy as “externally oriented,” meaning the economy was not structured to 
meet domestic needs and demands, but rather to produce products for export. They wrote, “Under 
these dependent capitalist systems, the common citizen is important as a cheap and easily exploitable 
source of labor rather than as a consumer. Therefore, there is little or no economic incentive for the 
privileged classes that dominate most Latin American governments to make the sacrifices necessary 
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reasoning is divorced from the reality of Dole’s contemporary corporate 
practice, as well as broadly held opinion regarding the nature of 
multinational corporations.165
We are persuaded that Judge Chaney exhibited a bias in favor of 
Dole by accepting this line of reasoning. The “new Dole” has been 
implicated in serious and widespread human rights abuses. A 2002 
Human Rights Watch report documented abuses related to Dole’s 
operations in Ecuador, then the largest exporter of bananas in the 
world.166
The report documented various abuses that occurred on Dole 
plantations. One of the major findings was the use of child labor on such 
plantations.167 The report also documented their exposure to toxic 
chemicals and their receiving wages well below the legal minimum wage 
to improve the conditions of the majority of the people.” Nicaragua was like other “banana 
republics” in being considered a favorable investment climate, meaning it had low labor, social, and 
environmental standards, of which Dole took advantage to maximize profits. THOMAS W. WALKER 
& CHRISTINE J. WADE, NICARAGUA: LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF THE EAGLE 85-86 (5th ed. 2011). 
For dates, see James E. Austin & Tomas O. Kohn, Standard Fruit Company in Nicaragua, in 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES: CASE STUDIES 205-30 (1990). For dates 
and discussion of the evolution of the Nicaraguan economy, see THOMAS W. WALKER & CHRISTINE 
J. WADE, NICARAGUA: LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF THE EAGLE 50 (5th ed. 2011). 
165 In our view, examining the “new” Dole’s labor record is not necessary to find reason to 
punish the corporation. Their institutional imperative is to maximize short-term profits; all other 
considerations are secondary. Accordingly, corporations typically seek out favorable investment 
climates, which are characterized by stable, anti-labor regimes (friendly governments, low wages, 
slim to nonexistent safeguards and protections, pro-corporate legal systems, and so on). Without a 
legitimate threat of punishment, there is no reason for a corporation to account for these “costs.” 
Simply put, the notion that Dole rehabilitated itself out of the goodness of its heart, as Dole’s 
lawyers would have the court believe, is absurd. This reasoning is accepted international opinion. 
The UN has provided a (modest) structural account of the widespread and prevalent “business-
related human abuses.” The UN Secretary General has sponsored numerous reports on “the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations” written by Harvard’s John Ruggie. In his February 
2007 report, he diagnoses the cause of the problem as a “fundamental institutional misalignment . . . 
between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, on the one hand, and the capacity of 
societies to manage their adverse consequences, on the other. This misalignment creates the 
permissive environment within which blameworthy acts by corporations may occur without 
adequate sanctioning or reparation. For the sake of the victims of abuse, and to sustain globalization 
as a positive force, this must be fixed.” John Ruggie, Report of the Special Rep. of the Secretary-
General on Issues of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007). In other words, without an institutional 
realignment that includes sanctioning and reparations, corporations will continue to take advantage 
of the “permissive conditions.” In short, Dole’s rehabilitation argument does not hold up to 
considered international opinion. That Judge Chaney was sympathetic enough to take the rather 
extreme step of vacating the punitive awards was quite a gift to Dole. 
166 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TAINTED HARVEST: CHILD LABOR AND OBSTACLES TO 
ORGANIZING ON ECUADOR’S BANANA PLANTATIONS 13-14 (Apr. 2002). 
167 Id. at 16, 18. 
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for banana workers.168 These acts constituted violations of numerous 
international legal conventions, such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.169 Thus, the “new Dole” has been complicit in potential 
international crimes. Moreover, according to Human Rights Watch, Dole 
violated its own corporate responsibility policies regarding labor 
conditions on their plantations.170
Since Dole left Nicaragua in the early 1980s, the only way to assess 
whether the “new Dole” was a rehabilitated version of its former self 
would have been to examine its record in other countries marked by poor 
environmental and labor protections.171 Given Dole’s heavy reliance on 
Ecuador as a source of bananas, its operations in that country disconfirm 
Dole’s rehabilitation.172
As the case progressed, Judge Chaney continued to give Dole the 
benefit of the doubt. An example is Judge Chaney’s conclusions about 
which actors were susceptible to the corrupting influence of financial 
incentives. As we have already shown, Judge Chaney concluded that due 
to Nicaragua’s extreme poverty, the poor communities rallied behind the 
DBCP plaintiffs because they expected the lawsuits to result in a 
windfall. According to the Judge Chaney, the community was seduced 
by the financial incentives and, therefore, supported the campaign to sue 
“Dole and Dow for the general conditions of poverty in Nicaragua and 
illness in Nicaragua.”173
Dole, on the other hand, is apparently not susceptible to the 
corruptible influence of financial incentives. In her Mejia written ruling, 
Judge Chaney responded to the Dole bribery allegations. Judge Chaney 
accepted Dole’s contention that “the accusation that these witnesses were 
offered an alleged $50,000 to $60,000—an amount far exceeding the 
lifetime earnings of the average Nicaraguan—strikes the Court as 
implausible on its face.”174 Why is this “implausible on its face”? The 
DBCP cases coming from Nicaragua presented Dole cases alleging over 
$9 billion in damages.175 As the first DBCP case from the country, its 
168 Id. at 2-3, 15, 21. 
169 Id. at 22. 
170 Id. at 80. 
171 Id. at 1. 
172 Id. at 1, 13-14. 
173 Written Ruling, Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049, at 27 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. 
June 15, 2009). 
174 Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
175 Carol Lawrence, Dole Settles Lawsuits Alleging Injuries from Crop Chemical, VENTURA 
COUNTY STAR, Sept. 6, 2012, available at www.vcstar.com/news/2012/sep/06/dole-settles-lawsuits-
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outcome would be consequential for future cases. By successfully 
contaminating all of the cases, Dole had the opportunity to save billions 
of dollars. Is it really implausible that Dole would pay what amounts to 
pittances in comparison to avoid absorbing such a deep financial hit? 
The plaintiffs claimed that Dole’s payments to the John Doe 
witnesses it relocated to Costa Rica were excessive. Judge Chaney 
concluded that “at most, Dole’s investigator did not understand the value 
of money in Nicaragua and Costa Rica,” adding that “although Dole may 
have been naive in its generous outlay of expense money to protect these 
John Doe witnesses, the court does not believe it suborned perjury.”176
In our view, the assumption that Dole and its investigator did not 
understand the value of money in the two countries is implausible on its 
face. The company had operated in the Central American region 
throughout the twentieth century. We think it is safe to assume that the 
company was familiar with basic economic matters like the cost of living 
and exchange rate. Moreover, the investigator in question was a native of 
Costa Rica.177
Dole also received the benefit of the doubt in Judge Chaney’s 
conclusion that the John Doe witnesses were the only members of the 
Chinandega community who resisted financial temptation. Judge Chaney 
wrote in her Mejia written ruling, 
In response to questions on cross-examination by [p]laintiffs’ counsel, 
each of the John Doe Witnesses confirmed under oath that they had 
not received money or anything else of value in exchange for their 
testimony. Instead, each explained that he or she was testifying for 
personal reasons that had nothing to do with money.178
She drew this conclusion in the face of proof that parts of the testimony 
were unreliable, and the fact that several witnesses admitted on 
numerous occasions that they lied on the expectation that Dole would 
pay them for doing so. 
In sum, when taking into account these biases, along with Judge 
Chaney’s undermining of the adversarial system, the argument presented 
in Steve Condie’s appeal that the plaintiffs were denied due process 
appears sound. 
alleging-injuries-from/?partner=RSS#ixzz2hAZ1h36. 
176 Written Ruling, Mejia, No. BC340049, at 38 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. June 15, 2009). 
177 Interview with Jason Glaser, supra note 102. 
178 Written Ruling, Mejia, No. BC340049, at 51 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. June 15, 2009). 
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V. CONCLUSION
As recognized by the United Nations, a dominant feature of the 
contemporary global economic system is the impunity enjoyed by 
transnational corporations for the widespread human rights abuses they 
commit in the Global South. During the post-WWII era, foreign victims 
of corporate abuses committed abroad were denied access to the U.S. 
judicial system on grounds of the forum non conveniens legal doctrine. 
After the Nicaraguan legislature countered this regime of impunity 
by passing the “anti-blocking statute,” Special Law 364, U.S. courts 
opened to Nicaraguan DBCP victims. The cases analyzed in this Article 
were the first of the thousands of DBCP cases emanating from 
Nicaragua.179 The Tellez case is considered significant as a test of how 
well the U.S. judicial system could respond to abuses committed by 
domestic corporations operating in poor developing countries. 
After an American jury found that Dole acted with malice and fraud 
in concealing the dangers of DBCP and awarded six Nicaraguan 
plaintiffs $3.2 million in compensatory damages and five plaintiffs $2.5 
million in punitive damages, this case seemed to indicate that foreign 
victims of American corporate abuse could gain justice in American 
courts. The optimism then eroded as the case progressed.  
Judge Chaney quickly struck the punitive damages award, finding 
they were “arbitrary.” This was followed by a dramatic reversal, in 
which the Mejia and Rivera cases were dismissed with prejudice on 
grounds that Dole was the victim of a widespread conspiracy that took 
root in Nicaragua, with the goal of defrauding Dole in U.S. courts. This 
dismissal led to Judge Chaney dismissing the Tellez case at the 
conclusion of the coram vobis legal procedure. 
In this Article, we have suggested that Dole achieved this dramatic 
rollback due to the success of its lawyers, Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, 
LLP, crafting their “contamination” legal defense. Judge Chaney 
facilitated this defense by disabling the adversarial system and through 
her own biases, all of which placed the foreign plaintiffs at a great 
disadvantage. In our view, this historic case demonstrates how even 
without the FNC doctrine denying justice to foreign plaintiffs, the U.S. 
legal system can still pose serious impediments to foreign victims of 
corporate abuses who are seeking justice on the corporations’ home turf. 
One of the impediments is the defense strategy used by Dole. Some 
of Dole’s tactics were to attack the opponents’ attorneys; to portray the 
opponents’ foreign society—its people, culture, and institutions—as 
179 Banana Workers Win $2.5 Million in Dole Lawsuit, supra note 21. 
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irredeemably corrupt; and to delegitimize all activism in support of the 
opponents’ cause. There is a danger that these tactics will become a 
playbook for corporate defendants to draw on when confronted by 
foreign plaintiffs. In addition, this case is being cited by pro-corporate 
legal observers as a reason for U.S. legislators to erect additional legal 
barriers to foreign plaintiffs.180
However, these impediments are surmountable. Indeed, there is 
reason to hope that foreign workers exposed to DBCP by U.S.-based 
multinational corporations can achieve some measure of justice in U.S. 
courts. In fact, last year Dole settled five lawsuits in the U.S. and thirty-
three in Nicaragua over its use of DBCP thirty years ago.181 The 
settlement reportedly included two Nicaragua judgments for $907.5 
million, but the total settlement remains confidential.182 The cases were 
brought by Provost Umphrey Law Firm in Texas. Dole’s attorneys 
claimed that some Provost Umphrey attorneys were co-conspirators in 
the supposed campaign to defraud the company. 
Some of the obstacles that the foreign plaintiffs faced in these cases 
were exceptional, for example, the non-adversarial system erected by 
Judge Chaney, her willingness to denounce the entire Nicaraguan legal 
system, and her past experience with a Colombian witness who was 
killed. However, this case does suggest how foreign plaintiffs from the 
Global South confront socio-cultural obstacles that arise from American 
judges’ prejudices toward their societies. We recommend that legal 
scholars place greater emphasis on these socio-cultural dynamics and 
how corporate defendants exploit them for tactical gain. 
180 See Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and 
Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456 (2011). For a 
critical response to Drimmer and Lamoree, see EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, MISSING THE POINT: A
RESPONSE TO THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT “THINK GLOBALLY, SUE LOCALLY” (July 
30, 2010), available at dg5vd3ocj3r4t.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/documents/Missing-the-
point.pdf. 
181 Lawrence, supra note 175. 
182 Id.
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